The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Collective Entities by Sweeney, Timothy F.
The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Collective Entities
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the
documents of collective entities' is an issue that is currently generating a great deal
of confusion in the federal courts. This confusion is the result of uncertainty regarding
the application of the Supreme Court's decisions in Fisher v. United States2 and
United States v. Doe3 to the documents of collective entities. In these cases, the Court
held that an individual can assert the fifth amendment privilege to avoid turning over
business documents demanded by a subpoena if the "act of producing" the
subpoenaed documents is sufficiently testimonial and incriminating. 4 In both Fisher
and Doe, however, the documents subpoenaed were those of an individual or
sole-proprietorship. Neither case involved the documents of collective entities.
This latter point is significant because, despite the decisions in Fisher and Doe,
the application of the fifth amendment privilege to the documents of collective
entities has been firmly established in a line of Supreme Court cases culminating with
Bellis v. United States.5 These cases hold that a collective entity does not have a fifth
amendment privilege,6 and that the representative of such an entity cannot assert his
or her own privilege to avoid turning over the entity's documents, 7 even if the
documents would incriminate the representative personally. 8 The Court's rationale
for this rule is that the fifth amendment privilege is a personal one and thus may only
be invoked by an individual acting in a personal, as opposed to a representative,
capacity. 9 Further, the Court points out that in order for the government to effectively
monitor the affairs of business entities, particularly those with economic influence,
access to the entity's records must predominate over any individual's claim of
privilege. 10
Since Fisher and Doe, most of the federal circuits to consider document
production cases where collective entities are involved have continued to adhere to
the rule laid out in Bellis and the cases preceding it. Il In the view of these courts, the
act of production analysis does not apply where the records of a collective entity are
1. A "collective entity" is defined as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart from
its individual members." Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974). Examples of collective entities include
corporations, partnerships, associations, and labor unions. A sole-proprietorship is not considered to be a collective entity.
2. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
3. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
4. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
5. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 28-104.
7. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
8. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 85-93.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
11. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), No. 86-4922, slip op. (5th Cir. March 31, 1987) (Lxi,
Genfed library, App file); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107
S. Ct. 918 (1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
594 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 943-45 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 819
(1984).
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involved. Therefore, the representative of such an entity must produce properly
subpoenaed documents, and cannot avoid doing so by arguing that the act of
production is potentially incriminating.
However, not all circuits share this view. The Third Circuit, for example, has
concluded that the act of production analysis applies regardless of the nature of the
entity or the type of documents involved.12 Thus, like the sole-proprietor in Doe, the
representative of a collective entity can refuse to produce documents if the act of
production is sufficiently testimonial and incriminating. And the Second, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits, while recognizing the validity of Bellis and the rule that a
collective entity and its representatives cannot generally assert the fifth amendment to
avoid producing documents, have applied the act of production analysis in certain
circumstances to allow a representative to avoid production. 13
Until the Supreme Court resolves the uncertainty that has arisen in the wake of
Fisher and Doe, 14 the lower federal courts will be left to grapple with the applicability
of those cases to document production issues involving collective entities and their
representatives. 15 In the meantime, this Note attempts to deal with some of the
uncertainty. Part II will discuss the evolution of the collective entity doctrine in
the Supreme Court. Part III will focus on the Fisher and Doe decisions, and discuss
the "act of production" doctrine developed in those cases. Part IV will consider the
various approaches that the federal courts of appeals have taken after Fisher and Doe
in document production cases involving collective entities. Finally, Part V will
suggest some conclusions and argue that the best approach in these kind of cases is
that being used in the Sixth Circuit.
A. Application of the Amendment to Business Documents- The Boyd Decision
The United States Supreme Court first dealt with the question of whether the
fifth amendment privilege applied to business documents in Boyd v. United States. 16
In Boyd the Court held that the privilege could be invoked to prevent the compelled
production of a partnership invoice which the Government had subpoenaed in the
12. In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 773 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d
Cir. 1985).
13. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp), 816 F.2d 569 (1lth Cir. 1987); United States v.
Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986); United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67,
73-74 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Saxon Ind.), 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari this term on a document production ease, In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986). The writ of
certiorari, however, was later dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 53. 107 S. Ct. 918 (1987).
15. An abundance of law review articles and notes have been written, since the Doe decision in 1984, on the
application of the fifth amendment in document production cases. See, e.g., Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking
the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. Rlv. 1 (1987); Alito, Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
58 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 27 (1986); Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents- Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49
Mo. L. REv. 439, 447 (1984); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Records, 84 MiC. L. REv. 1544
(1986); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Compelled Production of Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54
FoRDHi L. REv. 935 (1986); Note, United States v. Doe and its Progeny: A Reevaluation of the Fifth Amendment's
Application to Custodian's of Corporate Records, 40 U. Msmii L. REv. 793 (1986); Note, Organizational Papers and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REv. 640 (1986).
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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course of a forfeiture investigation. The Court determined that the subpoena in Boyd
violated both the fourth and fifth amendments, and observed with regard to the fifth
amendment that "a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owner of goods sought to be forfeited ... is compelling him to be a witness against
himself." ' 7
The result in Boyd was founded upon the assertion that the documents sought
were the "private property" of the two partners. 8 The property rationale1 9 underlying
Boyd inevitably meant that the government could not compel the production of
records over which it did not have a proprietary right superior to that of the
claimant. 20 This rule was later clarified to the extent that the claimant of the privilege,
to be successful, must not only own the documents sought, but possess them as
well. 21 Furthermore, because the Court was focusing on the ownership and
possession of documents, there was no need to consider the organizational character
of the records sought. Thus, in Boyd, the Court did not consider the document's
relationship to the business entity involved, a partnership. Rather the controlling
factor was that the invoice was the partner's private property. 22
B. The Exclusion of Corporations and their Representatives from the
Amendment's Protection
The Court's decision in Boyd created a broad privilege which could be invoked
to prevent any government attempt to obtain a person's private papers. While the
decision has been called the "fountainhead of modem analysis of the self-
incrimination clause,' '23 many of its specific pronouncements have been substantially
17. Id. at 634-35.
18. Id. at 624. The Court stressed the unconstitutionality of invading one's "indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property." Id. at 630.
19. The suggestion that "property rights" is the rationale underlying Boyd can be found in an article by Professor
Robert Heidt. Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. R~v.
439, 447 (1984). While Heidt's argument on this point is persuasive, it calls into question dicta in a great many cases that
have cited Boyd as a case protecting privacy. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); United States
v. White. 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 (1911). Indeed, many commentators
share this "privacy" view of Boyd. See, e.g., Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945, 956 (1977)[hereinafter Note, Constitutionally Protected
Privacy]; Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 Mica L. REv. 184, 184 (1977); Annot.,
48 L. Ed. 2d 852, 862 (1973). Such a reading of Boyd probably stems from the broad language employed by the Court
to express its conviction that individual rights must be protected. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1911).
Despite the predominance of the privacy view, Professor Heidt argues that the Boyd Court had not intended the
decision to be seen as protecting the "'partner's expectations of privacy." Heidt, supra, at 446 n.25. Privacy concerns
were not the Supreme Court's focus, Heidt argues, until much later. Id. at 442. So while the Court repeatedly referred
to the "private" papers of the partners, Heidt contends that the Court only meant that the invoice was the partner's private
property. Id. at 446. Heidt concludes on this point that, while the two rationales ultimately led to the same results, they
reflected different views about the purpose of the self-incrimination privilege, id. at 444, and developed at different times.
Id. at 442.
Although Heidt's article expressly does not deal with the collective entity issue, id. at 440 n. 1, the framework which
it outlines is useful in understanding some of the most significant cases impacting on the collective entity doctrine.
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, 1066-67 (1765)).
21. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918); see also Heidt, supra note 19, at 447-48.
22. Heidt, supra note 19, at 447.
23. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981).
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eroded over the years. 24 The first signs of this erosion occurred for mainly pragmatic
reasons in a case involving the documents of a corporation. 25 By 1906 the Court had
become sensitive to the implications of its property analysis when corporate records
were sought. Under that analysis, the government consistently would be prevented
from obtaining documents because the corporation would have a proprietary claim
superior to that of the government. 26 Consequently, government efforts to regulate
the corporate entity would be stifled substantially. 27
To avoid these negative implications, the Court sought to develop a rationale to
distinguish a corporation from an individual for fifth amendment document purposes.
This development began in Hale v. Henkel.2 8 In that case a Government subpoena
sought to compel Hale, the secretary and treasurer of a corporation under investiga-
tion for Sherman Act violations, to produce certain documents for the grand
jury.29 Despite a statutory grant of immunity that would protect him from prosecution
on the basis of any testimony or evidence that he produced, Hale refused to comply
with the subpoena. 30 He argued that, while the immunity statute would protect him,
it would not protect the corporation of which he was a representative, 3' and thus
assertion of the privilege was justified. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that
the fifth amendment privilege is a "purely personal" one that may not be invoked on
behalf of a third party, 32 even when the person claiming the privilege is the agent of
the third party, 33 and even when the third party is a corporation. 34
In Hale the Court was not forced to decide whether a corporation was a person
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 35 The Court did, however, discuss the
nature of the corporation as a state-created entity possessed of only those rights
granted to it by the state of incorporation. 36 In this discussion, the Court observed that
there is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation and that the latter
has no right to refuse to produce documents. 37This distinction, the Court said, is
founded upon a recognition of the powers of "visitation" retained by the state in
creating the corporation, 38 powers that enable the state as sovereign to investigate the
24. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 & n.8 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407
(1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976). But see, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327
(1973)("IThe fifth amendment] respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-condemnation."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416-17 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). For an excellent discussion of this debate, see Note, Constitutionally Protected Privacy, supra note 19.
25. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
26. Heidt, supra note 19, at 449-50.
27. Id.
28. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
29. Id. at 45-46.
30. Id. at 66.
31. Id. at 69.
32. Id. at 69-70.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 70.
35. Id. This fact has caused some commentators to suggest that the court skirted the issue by deciding the case on
the basis of the agency relationship. See, e.g., Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HAsv. L. REv. 1227, 1280 (1979)[hereinafter Developments in the Law].
36. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
37. Id. at 74.
38. Id. at 74-75.
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corporation's affairs to insure that it is not abusing its authority. 39 So while the Court
did not decide specifically the status of a corporation for fifth amendment purposes,
its discussion of the visitatorial powers strongly suggested what that status would be.
The developments in Hale were the first steps in the evolution of the collective
entity doctrine. Five years later, in Wilson v. United States,40 the Court extended and
clarified that doctrine. In Wilson the Court held that an officer of a corporation could
not claim his personal fifth amendment privilege to justify a refusal to produce the
corporation's books and records in response to a grand jury subpoena directed to the
corporation. This result would apply, the Court held, even if the production of
documents would tend to incriminate the officer, and even if the officer and not the
corporation was the subject of the grand jury investigation.4 ' The Court emphasized
that the amendment would protect the officer against the compulsory production of
his private books and papers, and would certainly not require him to give oral
testimony, 42 but noted that, with respect to the corporate records, the officer, by
assuming their custody had,
accepted the incident obligation to permit inspection.
... If the corporation were guilty of misconduct, he could not withhold its books to
save it; and if he were implicated in the violations of the law, he could not withhold the
books to protect himself from the effect of their disclosures. The reserved power of visitation
would seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated, . . . if guilty officers could refuse
inspection of the records and papers of the corporation. 43
In a companion case, 44 the Court held that the same result would obtain when the
subpoena requiring production of the corporate books is directed to the individual
corporate officer.45
The Wilson decision is based on two related conclusions. First, the Court
expressly decided that a corporation does not have a fifth amendment privilege, 46 and
thus cannot, on the basis of self-incrimination, lawfully resist a demand for
production of corporate records. Specifically, the Court quoted extensively from its
discussion in Hale of the visitatorial powers, concluding that these powers necessarily
reach the corporation's books and records.47
The Court's second conclusion was that an individual corporate representative
could not assert a personal privilege to retain the corporation's books against any
39. The Court observed that "the corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public. . . . There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it
has exceeded its powers." Id. For a good discussion of the visitatorial powers rationale developed by the Court in Hale,
see Note, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Visitatorial Power of Congress Over State Corporations, 30 CoLumi.
L. Rsv. 103, 107-108 (1930)[hereinafter Note, Visitatorial Powers].
40. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
41. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
42. Id. at 377.
43. Id. at 382, 384-85.
44. Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911).
45. Id. at aO0.
46. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
47. Id. at 383-85.
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demand of the government which the corporation was required to recognize. 48
Consequently, this involved a waiver theory: By accepting control of a corporation's
books or records, the representative has waived any personal fifth amendment
privilege with respect to those records. 49
While courts have consistently relied upon these conclusions as justification for
denial of the privilege to corporations and their representatives, 5 0 they have been
occasionally criticized. Some commentators have argued that the Court was moved
primarily by expediency, 5' and that the visitatorial powers rationale was put forth to
obscure the Court's actual conclusion that the federal government's regulatory
interest denied the corporation a privilege against self-incrimination. 52 Reliance upon
the visitatorial powers for this purpose, these commentators argue, begs the essential
question-the extent to which the visitatorial power itself is subject to the privilege.5 3
Furthermore, some critics view the waiver notion as a convenient justification
for the Court's decision that obstacles to the exercise of government power be kept
to a minimum in the corporate context. 54 Since the assertion of a personal privilege
by a corporate representative would create a significant obstacle, the Court refused to
find a privilege in that context. 55 Notably, however, there has not been a voluntary
waiver by the representative. Rather, the representative is prohibited from asserting
the privilege when corporate records are sought.5 6This view ignores, however, the
potential indignities that the individual might be forced to suffer in producing a
self-incriminatory document,5 7 indignities supposedly guarded against by the fifth
amendment. 58
Despite criticism of the rationales underlying the Court's early collective entity
cases, courts continued to adhere to the doctrine when corporate records were
sought. 59 Indeed, the invariable application of the visitatorial powers rationale set out
48. Id. at 385.
49. See Note, Visiratorial Powers, supra note 39, at 106.
50. See Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CH.
L. REv. 687, 701 & nn.65-67 (1951).
51. Id. at 704.
52. Note, The Constitutional Rights ofAssociations to Assert the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 394, 396 (1964)[hereinafter Note, Constitutional Rights ofAssociations]. The Note suggests that the laissez-fairre
atmosphere of the time probably compelled the Court to employ the visitatorial powers doctrine as justification for its
conclusion. Id.
53. Meltzer, supra note 50, at 702. The author also points out that English courts, while recognizing the visitatorial
power, had accorded the privilege against self-incrimination to corporations. Id.
54. Id. at 703.
55. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
56. Note, Visitatorial Powers, supra note 39, at 106 & n.20. See also Note, Constitutional Rights ofAssociations,
supra note 52, at 403 & n.74.
57. See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1282. The common law had allowed a corporate officer to
refuse to produce a corporate document that might incriminate the officer. See also Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule
Forbidding the Use of Illegally Siezed Evidence, 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 60, 65 (1941).
58. Meltzer, supra note 50, at 703. See also Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1281-82:
When the Court has considered claims of privilege, not by collective entities, but by individuals closely
associated with them, its approach has been clouded by the existence of that association. Rather than
distinguishing such cases on the basis of the policies at stake when a natural rather than an artificial person
asserts the privilege, the Court has dealt with the fifth amendment claims of corporate functionaries over
corporate documents as a problem closely related to the corporation's lack of fifth amendment protection. As
a result, the Court's reasoning in these cases has often been confused and unpersuasive.
59. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726 (1944); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
[Vol. 48:295
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in Hale and White resulted in an inflexible rule that no privilege ever applies to
corporate documents regardless of the size of the corporation or the nature of the
relationship between the corporation and the representative claiming the privilege.60
Further, courts refused to yield to the argument that denial of the privilege to the
individual representative was contrary to the spirit of the privilege. Instead, the
necessity of preserving the government's power to regulate in the corporate sphere
was held to predominate over the individual's personal privilege. 6'
C. Expansion of the Collective Entity Doctrine to Other Entities
Despite the Court's apparent awareness of the need to facilitate government
regulation of economically influential associations, 62 subsequent decisions were
reluctant to expand the Hale and Wilson results to noncorporate entities. 63 A rigid
adherence to the visitatorial powers doctrine explained the Court's reluctance to take
this step. 64 Thus, because the visitatorial power is derived from the state's creation of
the corporation, it would not exist in these other contexts even though substantial
similarities to corporations-including economic impact on society-are present.
The Third Circuit expressed this view in United States v. White,65 a case
involving the documents of a labor union, an unincorporated association. Rejecting
any attempt to treat the labor union like a corporation, 66 the court held that the
custodian was entitled to withhold union documents that would incriminate him so
long as he was a member of the union. 67 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. 68
In doing so, the Court put to rest any doubt that the principles formulated in the early
collective entity cases would be limited to corporations. In an opinion by Justice
Murphy, the Court held that the representative of a labor union could not assert a fifth
amendment privilege to avoid producing the union's documents, even though the
documents would incriminate him. 69
The White Court viewed the early collective entity cases as motivated by an
understanding of the government's need to regulate the affairs of economically
powerful organizations. 70 This need would not diminish, the Court observed, simply
U.S. 151 (1923); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
221 U.S. 612 (1911); see also Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 636 (1973).
60. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Associations, supra note 52, at 411. In fact, in Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913), which concerned the records of a dissolved one-person corporation, the Court took Hale and Wilson to
their logical conclusions. Stating that it did not require extended discussion, the Court held that despite the dissolution the
documents retained their "essential character" as corporate documents, and thus remained subject to examination when
required by competent authority. Id. at 80. The Court, therefore, denied application of the privilege to an agent of the
corporation's sole shareholder, since the shareholder himself could not have asserted the privilege because of the corporate
character of the documents. Id. at 79-80.
61. See supra note 59.
62. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911); see also supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
63. See e.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Corretjer v. Draughon, 88 F.2d 116 (st Cir. 1937).
64. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Associations, supra note 52, at 398.
65. 137 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1943).
66. Id. at 26.
67. Id.
68. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
69. Id. at 704.
70. Id. at 700.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
because the visitatorial power may be lacking as to a particular type of organization. 71
Consequently, while the visitatorial powers doctrine was a "convenient vehicle" to
justify the Court's denial of the privilege to corporations, it was not the decisive
justification. 72 Rather, Justice Murphy declared:
[T]he power to compel the production of the records of any organization, whether it be
incorporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of the federal and state
governments to enforce their laws, with the privilege against self-incrimination being limited
to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimi-
nation through his own testimony or personal records. 73
Whether an organization and its representatives could invoke this personal
privilege depended, the Court argued, upon the nature of the organization and its
activities. 74 Thus, the Court declared:
The test ... is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular
type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and
activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests
of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only. If so, the
privilege cannot be invoked on behalf of the organization or its representatives in their
official capacity. 75
The Court concluded that the labor union in White met the terms of this
"impersonality" test.76 The scope of the union's activities as well as the size of its
membership required that the government be allowed access to its books and records
without being obstructed by the fifth amendment claims of the custodian.77 Further,
no personal privacy interests of the representative were implicated by denying the
privilege, because the documents were owned by the union and routinely open to
inspection by the individual members. 78
The impersonality test put forth by the Court in White implied that there were
entities that would not come within its terms, and that, therefore, the representatives
of those entities would be allowed to assert the fifth amendment privilege when the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 700-01.
74. Id. at 701. See also Fraser, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to Custodians of
Organizational Records, 33 WASH. L. Rav. 435, 440 (1958).
75. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
76. Id.
77. The court stated:
The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations and their
representatives demand that the constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate those
activities be correspondingly effective. The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its
representatives is usually to be found in the official records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak
of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many
federal and state laws would be impossible.
Id. at 700.
78. The court did not feel privacy interests were implicated because:
Such records and papers are not the private records of the individual members or officers of the organization.
Usually, if not always, they are open to inspection by the members and this right may be enforced on appropriate
occasions by available legal procedures. . . . They therefore embody no element of personal privacy and carry
with them no claim of personal privilege.
Id. at 699-700 (citation omitted).
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entity's documents were sought. 79 Notably, however, the White test has never been
applied to enable a corporate representative to offset the privilege.80 Courts have
instead continued to rely on both the visitatorial powers analysis, and the principle
that a personal privilege may not be invoked by a custodian as to the documents of
an entity that is not itself privileged. 8' Furthermore, when the White test has been
applied to the representatives of other entities-partnerships, for instance-rarely has
the privilege been found to exist. 82 This is certainly not surprising since very few
organizations can be said to embody solely the private or personal interests of their
members, 83 but rather will embody some combination of the two. 84
On the other hand, the Court's emphasis in White on the personal nature of the
privilege has been consistently relied upon in later decisions involving organiza-
tions. 85 The Court's view is that when an individual acts as the representative of a
group, he or she does not exercise personal rights, but rather the rights of the group.
Since the group has no fifth amendment privilege as to its documents, the
representative will likewise have no privilege, even though production of the group's
documents would incriminate the representative personally. 86
Most recently, in Bellis v. United States,8 7 the Court persuasively reaffirmed its
commitment to this aspect of the White case, and to the collective entity doctrine in
general. Indeed, Bellis demonstrated how far the Court would be willing to extend
that doctrine. 88
Bellis concerned the partnership documents of a dissolved three-member law
firm. 89 In an eight to one decision, 90 the Court denied application of the fifth
amendment privilege to one of the firm's former partners. 9' Reiterating the basic
principles set out in White, the Court stated that the privilege functions to protect only
79. See Fraser, supra note 74, at 440.
80. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Associations, supra note 52, at 411 & n. 138.
81. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 722 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984);
see generally infra text accompanying notes 137-59.
82. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789, 791 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963); United States v.
Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 205-10 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418, 421 (N.D. Cal.
1948).
83. See Meltzer, supra note 50, at 705; Fraser, supra note 74, at 445.
84. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100 (1974); see generally infra text accompanying notes 87-101.
85. See, e.g., McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (Civil Rights Congress); Cureio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1957) (labor union); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367-72 (1951) (Communist Party
of Denver); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1950) (Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee); see also
Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 636, 646 (1973).
86. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
87. 417 U.S. 85 (1974),
88. The Court in Bellis explicitly refused to accept the Boyd decision as precedent for the proposition that a member
of a partnership may assert the privilege to avoid turning over the partnership's documents. Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85, 95 n.2 (1974). Boyd dealt with the issue of whether the privilege was available to the partners of a glass company
to protect them from turning over an invoice which the government had subpoenaed. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 618-19 (1886). The Court allowed the fifth amendment privilege to the partners, but did so on the theory that the
partners had a proprietary claim to the records superior to that of the government. Id. at 628 (quoting Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066-67 (1765)). The Boyd Court did not consider the issue of whether the records of a
partnership held in a representative capacity were within the scope of the privilege, because the Court settled the matter
entirely on the private property theory. See supra note 19.
89. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1974).
90. Justice Douglas dissented.
91. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1974).
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natural individuals, 92 and may not be employed by an individual to avoid production
of records which are held in a representative capacity. 93 Furthermore, since the
documents of organized collective entities do not embody significant elements of
personal privacy, they do not require the fifth amendment's protection. 94 The Court
noted, however, that this analysis only made sense in those instances where the
"organization... is recognized as an independent entity apart from its individual
members. 95 Therefore, while some partnerships, Wall Street law firms for example,
may represent organized institutional activity which precludes any claim of a fifth
amendment privilege with respect to the entity's documents, the difficult question
becomes whether this same result should apply to the small three-member partnership
at issue in Bellis.96
The Court indicated that, while the size of the entity at issue would require it to
"explore the outer limits" of the White analysis, 97 the result would not be different.
Although the law firm in Bellis was certainly small, it was nevertheless a "formal
institutional arrangement" with an "established institutional identity independent of
its individual partners.' '98 In this respect, the Court noted, the partnership was not
different from a corporation. Consequently, the organizational character of the
records and the representative aspects of the claimant's possession of them would
predominate over any individual's personal interest. 99 The Court then concluded that
the White formulation could not be reduced to a simple proposition based solely on
the size of the organization,10 or the form which the organization takes:
Every State has now adopted laws permitting incorporation of professional associations, and
increasing numbers of lawyers, doctors, and other professionals are choosing to conduct
their business affairs in the corporate form rather than the more traditional partnership.
Whether corporation or partnership, many of these firms are independent entities whose
financial records will be held by a member of the firm in a representative capacity. In these
circumstances, the applicability of the privilege should not turn on an insubstantial
difference in the form of the business enterprise.' 0'
92. Id. at 89-90.
93. Id. at 89.
94. The Court expressed why records of organizations do not embody elements of personal privacy in the following
statement:
[A] substantial claim of privacy or confidentiality cannot often be maintained with respect to the financial
records of an organized collective entity. Control of such records is generally strictly regulated by statute or by
the rules and regulations of the organization, and access to the records is generally guaranteed to others in the
organization. In such circumstances, the custodian of the organization's records lacks the control over their
content and location and the right to keep them from the view of others which would be characteristic of a claim
of privacy and confidentiality.
Id. at 92.
95. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974).
96. Id. at 94-95.
97. Id. at 94.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id. at 99-100.
100. Id. at 100.
101. Id. at 100-01. Notably, the Court expressly declined to follow the impersonality test set out in White. Id. at 100;
see supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
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The Court conceded, however, that there might be certain circumstances in
which this strict interpretation of the collective entity doctrine would not apply. 10 2
The Court left open the possibility that the representatives of small family partner-
ships, or of partnerships in which there is a "pre-existing relationship of confiden-
tiality among the partners," 1o3 might be able to assert the privilege successfully.
Lower courts, however, have rarely applied this exception.1t 4
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SHIFr IN Focus IN DOCUMENT PRODUCTION CASES
A. The Fisher Case
The rule that a representative of a collective entity could not assert a personal
privilege when the entity's documents were sought was well settled at least until 1976
when the Court handed down its decision in Fisher v. United States. l05Fisher
concerned the documents of a sole-proprietor under investigation by the IRS for
possible tax liability. Specifically, the documents in issue were the workpapers of the
taxpayer's accountant which the taxpayer had turned over to his attorney in
connection with the investigation. An IRS subpoena sought production of the
documents from the attorney, 0 6 who, along with the taxpayer, asserted both the fifth
amendment privilege and the attorney-client privilege. The Court noted that the
attorney could not assert his client's fifth amendment privilege to avoid turning over
documents that were in the attorney's possession.10 7 The attorney could, however,
assert the attorney-client privilege if the fifth amendment would have protected the
documents while they were in the taxpayer's possession.10 8 In concluding that the
taxpayer would not have been entitled to the privilege, the Court rather rigidly
focused on the specific language of the amendment.' 0 9 Thus, under Fisher, the
amendment's protection will only apply when a communication made by an accused
is: 1) compelled, 2) testimonial, and 3) incriminating.10
In this regard the Court reasoned that when the preparation of the documents
sought had been wholly voluntary, they could not be said to contain any compelled
102. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100 (1974).
103. Id.
104. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Doe), 605 F. Supp. 174, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Given the
difficulties inherent in satisfying the Bellis test, it comes as no surprise that neither the parties nor the Court could discover
a reported post-Bellis case in which a partner successfully invoked the Fifth Amendment to block access to partnership
records."); see also, Annot., 17 A.L.R.4th 1039 (1982).
105. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
106. Id. at 394-95.
107. Id. at 398-99.
108. Id. at 404.
109. Id. at 396-97, 408. Significantly, the Court downplayed the role of privacy as an interest protected by the fifth
amendment. Id. at 399. Indeed, the Court asserted that it had "never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates the
privilege." Id.
110. Id. at 408. In denying application of the privilege in other contexts, the Court had also focused on the language
of the amendment. Thus, the privilege did not apply because there was no testimonial self-incrimination when the state
compelled a suspect to give a handwriting sample, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967); to give a voice
exemplar, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967); or to produce blood, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 760-65 (1966).
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testimonial evidence. 1 ' Consequently, the contents of the documents were not
protected by the privilege. The Court then proceeded to consider the "act of
producing" the subpoenaed documents, and observed that this act would have
"communicative aspects of its own." "1 2 Specifically, the taxpayer in turning over the
document would be forced to concede both the existence of the documents and his
possession or control of them." 3 Compulsion is therefore clearly present and will
give rise to the privilege if it is both testimonial and incriminating." 4 This
determination, the Court observed, would depend upon the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. "15 On the basis of the facts in Fisher, the Court held that the
act of producing the documents would not be sufficiently testimonial and incrimi-
nating to give rise to the privilege." 16
The Court in Fisher took a new approach in analyzing document production
cases. Rather than focus on the contents of the documents and the accompanying
privacy interests of the claimant,'' 7 which it had done in Bellis and White, 1 8 the
Fisher Court focused on the compulsion inherent in answering a grand jury
subpoena."19 Consequently, because no compelled testimony is contained in volun-
tarily created documents, the protection of the fifth amendment privilege will
apparently have to turn on the compulsion inherent in producing the documents. 120
B. Unresolved Questions
Two questions bearing on the continued validity of the collective entity doctrine
remain unresolved after Fisher. First, it is not clear what effect the act of production
I 11. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976). The Court reasoned that, when documents are in the
attorney's hands, no compulsion is present because in such a situation compelling the attorney to turn the documents over
does not compel the taxpayer to do anything. Id. at 397. Furthermore, because the documents were prepared by a person
other than the taxpayer (they were prepared by the accountant), the documents would not contain testimonial declarations
by that person. Id. at 409.
112. Id. at 410-11.
113. Id. at 410.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 411-13. The Court argued that by complying with the subpoena the taxpayer would only be indicating
his belief that the documents are those described in the subpoena, id. at 410, an indication which the Court determined
would not rise to the level of testimony. Id. at 411. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the existence of the papers
was a "foregone conclusion," id., a point which suggests that when the government is unsure of the document's existence
or the taxpayer's possession of them a different result might be reached. Finally, the Court concluded that, even if there
were some "minimal testimonial significance" associated with turning the documents over, that testimony would
certainly not be incriminating. Id. at 412. According to the Court, the implied admissions would incriminate sufficiently
only if they would serve to authenticate the documents, id. at 412 & n. 12, an occasion which it concluded would not be
likely here. Id. at 413.
117. See supra note 109.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 78 & 94.
119. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97, 408 (1976).
120. The Court reserved the question of whether the fifth amendment privilege would be available to an individual
who owned and authored the private business documents sought by the subpoena. Id. at 414. In reserving this question,
the Court cited Boyd with apparent approval. Id. Some courts have interpreted this as an indication that certain private
business documents are protected in themselves regardless of the act of production analysis. See, e.g., United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d
1033 (3d Cir. 1980). The view expressed in these decisions is that the fifth amendment still has a privacy component Note,
The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: the Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HAv.
L. Rv. 683, 693 (1982). This controversy was resolved to some extent by the Supreme Court in United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 610-12 (1984); see infra text accompanying note 133; see also Heidt, supra note 19, at 472 n.136.
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analysis will have on the collective entity doctrine. The documents at issue in Fisher
were not, of course, those of a collective entity. ' 2 ' Nevertheless, despite the Court's
apparent approval of the doctrine at several places in the opinion, 22 the logic of
Fisher arguably compels the conclusion that the act of producing the entity's
documents would give rise to the privilege in favor of the custodian if sufficiently
testimonial and incriminating to that custodian.' 2 3 Because the modem collective
entity cases focused on the contents of the documents and the validity of an
expectation of privacy with regard to those contents,' 2 4 the Court's shift in focus to
an act of production analysis may render the Court's prior collective entity analysis
inapplicable.
Second, the Court did not set out a clear example of what it would require for
the act of production to rise to the level of testimonial self-incrimination. Because the
Court decided that no testimonial self-incrimination was present on the facts in
Fisher,25 lower courts have been left to grapple with the Court's new focus on the
act of production without any clear indication of its proper application. Consequently,
these courts have not taken a consistent approach to the question, and, as would be
expected, their conclusions have varied.' 26
C. The Doe Decision-Continued Uncertainty
Neither of these unresolved questions were answered by the Court in United
States v. Doe, 127 the most recent Supreme Court case to deal with document
production. In Doe a subpoena was served on the owner of a sole-proprietorship
demanding the production of certain business records that were in his possession. ' 28
The district court granted the owner's motion to quash the subpoena because it
determined that the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial
self-incrimination. 129 The Third Circuit affirmed, but did so on the basis of its belief
that both the contents and the act of producing the records were testimonial and
incriminating. 130
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's determination that the contents
of the documents were privileged. 13' The Court thus made clear what Fisher would
seem to demand: The contents of voluntarily created documents are not privileged
121. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 nn.2-3 (1976).
122. See id. at 408, 413 & n.14.
123. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985).
124. Id. at 528 n.2.
125. See supra text accompanying note 116.
126. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051 (Ist Cir. 1980) (allowing the privilege) and In re
Special Grand Jury No.1, Empanelled Dec. 1977 Term, 465 F. Supp. 800 (D.Md. 1978) (allowing the privilege) with
United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (denying the privilege)
and In re Grand Jury Empanelled on January 17, 1980, 505 F. Supp. 1041 (D.N.J. 1981) (denying the privilege). See
generally Heidt, supra note 19.
127. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
128. Id. at 606-07.
129. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 541 F. Supp. I (D.N.J. 1981).
130. In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982).
131. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984).
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because they do not contain compelled testimonial evidence. 132 After Doe this lack
of privilege obtains even when the documents sought, unlike in Fisher, are created
by the claimant and are in the claimant's possession.133 The Court, however, affirmed
the circuit court's holding that the act of producing the documents was privileged and
could only be compelled with a grant of use immunity. 134
However, after Doe, the standard by which the Court determines whether an act
of production is sufficiently testimonial and incriminating remains unclear. In Doe
the Court simply deferred to the district court's factual determination of the issue,
with which the Third Circuit had agreed, without making any comments on the legal
basis of those determinations. 135 Presumably, then, lower courts are given wide
discretion to resolve this issue in any way they like, and, so long as it cannot be said
that their determinations have "no support in the record,"' 136 they will not be
disturbed on appeal. Furthermore, like Fisher, Doe did not involve the records of a
collective entity. Thus, it remains unclear whether the new focus is to apply at all to
such entities.
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' VIEWS OF THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE AFTER
FISHER AND DOE
A. The Majority Rule
A majority of federal courts that have considered document production issues
since Fisher have continued to apply the collective entity doctrine. 137 The view of
these courts is that while Fisher, and later Doe, changed the analysis when personal
records were sought from an individual or sole-proprietorship, those cases did not
alter the analysis when organizational records were sought. 38 Consequently, the
entity itself as well as the representative acting in an official capacity may not rely on
the fifth amendment privilege to avoid turning over documents.
132. Id. at 610.
133. Id. at 611-12. The Court thus resolved the issue left open in Fisher as to whether the privilege would be
available to an individual who owned and authored private documents sought by a subpoena. See supra note 120.
134. Id. at 613-14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 614.
137. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), No. 86-4922, slip op. (5th Cir. March 31, 1987) (Ltsis, Genfed
library, App file); United States v. Vallance, 793 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 918 (1987);1n re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985); Inre Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln).
767 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 357 n.30 (1st Cir. 1985); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d
465, 471 n.9 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17 (1985); United States v. Centennial Builders, 747 F.2d 678, 684
(11 th Cir. 1984); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas),
727 F.2d 941, 943-45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 8, 1983, 722
F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Faler, 721
F.2d 1072, 1083 (7th Cir. 1983); Heinold Hog Mkt., Inc. v. McCoy, 700 F.2d 611, 613 (10th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Harrison, 653 F.2d 359, 361-62 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Alderson, 646 F.2d 421,422-23 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 8621 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings United States, 626 F.2d 1051, 1053 (Ist Cir. 1980).
138. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 943-44 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
819 (1984).
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These courts base their decisions on the Supreme Court's unvarying adherence
to the collective entity doctrine, 139 as well as the language in Fisher approving that
doctrine. 140 Moreover, these courts view Bellis and White as stirring reiterations of
these principles, and frequently cite those cases for the proposition that the privilege
is purely personal and may not be exercised by the representative of a collective
group. 141
The Sixth Circuit is representative of the courts that have continued to.
summarily deny fifth amendment protection to collective entities and their represen-
tatives. 142 The court demonstrated this most recently in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Morganstern).14 3 In that case the court, sitting en banc, refused to allow the
representatives of several corporations and partnerships to invoke the fifth amend-
ment to avoid turning over the entities' documents. "44 Relying on Bellis and White,
the court observed:
It is a truism that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a personal one.
No collective entity may claim it. Since collective entities can act only through officers and
agents, the effect of permitting custodians of partnership and corporate records to avoid
production of such records in reliance on the Fifth Amendment would be to extend the
privilege ... to the collective entities. The custodian ... acts only in a representative
capacity, not as an individual, and production of the records is not a testimonial act of the
custodian. Production of the records communicates nothing more than the fact that the one
producing them is a representative of the corporation or partnership.145
The court's conclusion that the production of entity records is not a testimonial
act of the custodian prompted the court to go another step and, in effect, warn the
Government that any attempt at trial to implicate the custodian on the basis of the
testimonial-free act of production would be subject to a motion to suppress." 46
Apparently, the court was assuming that in the collective entity context the
representative's act of producing documents is by definition testimony-free. If,
however, the Government attempted to add testimonial value to the act of production,
the court would step in and prohibit the Government from doing so. 147
While this approach addresses the dilemma of the document custodian who is
fearful that the act of providing corporate documents will later be used to incriminate
the custodian, it is not required by Fisher. The Supreme Court's decision in Curcio
139. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
465 U.S. 1085 (1984).
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 1981).
142. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985);
Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17 (1985); In re Grand Jury Empanelled March
8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984).
143. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985).
144. Id. at 148.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Eighth Circuit recently adopted this view. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-Wv-71-5), 784 F.2d 857 (8th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 918 (1987). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has expressly rejected this position.
In re Special Federal Grand Jury Empanelled October 31, 1985, No. 87-5209, slip op. (3d Cir. May 20, 1987).
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v. United States, 148 which was approved in Fisher,149 as well as language in Fisher
itself, supports this assertion. In Curcio a unanimous Court held that a custodian of
union records could not be required, on the basis of the White rule, to testify orally
as to the whereabouts of those records.150 The Court believed that requiring oral
testimony of this kind forced the custodian to disclose the contents of his mind. 151 As
for document production, however, the Court reaffirmed the validity of the collective
entity doctrine. ' 52
This reaffirmation is significant because it occurred despite the Court's explicit
recognition that a custodian's act of producing documents "is itself a representation
that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena."' 153 Indeed, the
Curcio Court found no problem with requiring the custodian to identify and
authenticate the documents, because such an act would merely be "auxiliary to the
production," 154 and would subject the custodian to "little, if any, further danger of
incrimination." 155
Fisher, of course, expressly recognized what was implicit in Curcio-that the
act of production may have testimonial aspects. 156 Further, when the records are
those of a sole-proprietor or individual, Fisher and Doe allow this implied testimony
to trigger the fifth amendment privilege if the testimony is sufficiently incriminatory.
This will be the case, the Court observed in Fisher, if the implied admissions serve
to authenticate the documents. 57 In the collective entity context, however, Fisher
approves the Curcio analysis:
In these [collective entity] cases compliance with the subpoena is required even though
the books have been kept by the person subpoenaed and his producing them would itself be
sufficient authentication to permit their introduction against him. 1 58
Clearly, the Court acknowledges a different rule when the records of a collective
entity are involved. In those kinds of cases, it does not matter if the custodian's act
of producing documents is testimonial or incriminating, because the custodian's
personal privilege to avoid incrimination does not extend to the documents of an
entity that are held in a representative capacity. Indeed, as the Court noted in Fisher,
production may not be avoided in the collective entity context even though such
production serves to authenticate the documents and enables the Government to later
introduce them against the custodian. Thus, the Sixth Circuit's practice of prohibiting
the Government's use of testimony inherent in the act of production is not consistent
with what the Fisher Court understood the rule to be in collective entity cases. 159
148. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
149. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410, 413 (1976).
150. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1957).
151. Id. at 128.
152. Id. at 122-23.
153. Id. at 125.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1985) (Garth, J., dissenting).
156. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
157. Id. at 410-13; see supra text accompanying notes 112-16 and 134.
158. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 413 n.14 (1976) (emphasis added).
159. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the first Sixth Circuit case to define this limitation concerned the
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B. The Second Circuit's View
The Second Circuit's decisions in this area present a view somewhat related to
that of the majority.'60 Generally, this circuit will not allow the fifth amendment
privilege to be asserted by the representative of a collective entity.'61 This position is
based on the long line of precedent supporting the collective entity doctrine.16 2 In
certain circumstances, however, the circuit has been persuaded to sway from the
doctrine. 163
In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Saxon Industries),164 the court
applied the act of production analysis to prevent the government from compelling the
production of corporate records from a former officer of a corporation who had taken
the records without authorization. 65 Moreover, in In re Katz, t 66 the court held that
an individual could claim the fifth amendment privilege on the basis of the act of
production doctrine when the subpoena of corporate records is directed to that indi-
vidual. 67 In the court's view, the subpoenas in these two cases compelled the
claimants to personally produce and authenticate corporate documents. 68 Because this
act of production was held to be self-incriminatory, the subpoenas were contrary to
Fisher. 169
The controlling factor in these decisions was that neither subpoena gave the
corporation an option to appoint someone to produce the records who would not be
incriminated by the act of production. '7 0 Indeed, the Second Circuit has made clear
that when the subpoena is directed to the corporation there will be no circumstances
under which the fifth amendment will allow the documents to be withheld, because
the corporation has no privilege. 171 If the corporate custodian would incriminate him
or herself by producing the records-a situation which the circuit characterizes as
records of an individual taxpayer, not those of a collective entity. United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th
Cir. 1983).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 137-59. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have recently followed the
Second Circuit's approach. See United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 574 (1986); In
re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.), 816 F.2d 569 (11th Cir. 1987).
161. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 793 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 45-46
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56
(2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Saxon Indus.), 722 F.2d 981, 984-85 (2d Cir. 1983).
162. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1985).
163. See United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1984); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Saxon Indus.), 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980).
164. 722 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1983).
165. Id. at 986-87.
166. 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980).
167. Id. at 125-26.
168. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1459 (1986); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
169. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1985).
170. Id.
171. United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen
Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106S. Ct. 1459 (1986); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces
Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Saxon Indus.), 722 F.2d 981, 986
(2d Cir. 1983).
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unusual 712- the corporation must appoint some other employee to produce the
records. 173 If such an employee cannot be found, the corporation must appoint an
outside agent who has no previous connection with the corporation that would make
the testimonial act of production incriminating. 174
While this construction of the Fisher decision might seem reasonable on the
facts of Saxon Industries and In re Katz, it is not consistent with the principle that the
representative of a collective entity may not assert a personal privilege when an
entity's records are sought. The circuit's consistent support for Bellis and White is
puzzling since the practical result of its analysis often will be contrary to the specific
language of those decisions. 75 Indeed, the court's analysis would logically seem to
require an act of production evaluation in virtually every situation in which the
subpoena is directed to a custodian, and the custodian asserts that the act of
production would be incriminating. Such a result was surely not contemplated in
Bellis, as Fisher itself implicitly observed. 176
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's practice of allowing another employee or an
outside agent to produce the records in the "unusual circumstance" where the
custodian's act of production would be incriminating is not a workable solution,
particularly in the case of a professional corporation with one or few shareholders. In
such a situation, another employee will usually not exist to produce the records, and
if one does exist, he or she will likely raise the same objection to production as the
person originally subpoenaed. Moreover, if an agent or another employee is
appointed, the act of directing the agent or employee to the records sought by the
subpoena may itself be an implicit admission by the custodian that these are the
records demanded and that they are in the custodian's possession or control. The
better rule, and one easier of application, is that set out in the long line of collective
entity cases and endorsed in Fisher: A representative of a collective entity does not
have a fifth amendment privilege to avoid turning over the entity's documents even
though the documents themselves or the act of producing them would incriminate the
representative personally.
172. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1459 (1986).
173. Id. at 47.
174. Id.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75 and 89-101. The Fourth Circuit characterized the Second Circuit's
approach as the "most reasonable," and recently adopted it as the rule in that circuit:
We agree with the Second Circuit's approach. The basic rule of Bellis continues after Doe, and normally a
corporate representative or agent cannot claim a fifth amendment privilege against producing corporate
documents. There will be rare occasions where an individual's production of those documents may amout to
testimonial self-incrimination. In those limited circumstances, the individual has a personal fifth amendment
privilege, but the corporation must comply with the summons through some other person.
United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1986). See also In re Grand Jury No. 86-3 (Will Roberts Corp.),
816 F.2d 569 (11 th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
176. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 413 n.14 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
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C. The Third Circuit's View
The logical fulfillment of the Second Circuit's reasoning is demonstrated in two
recent decisions of the Third Circuit. 177 In In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),178 the
Third Circuit held that the sole shareholder of a one-person professional corporation
may assert the fifth amendment privilege when a subpoena directed to that one person
seeks the corporation's records. 179 In Brown the court held that the act of producing
the records of his accounting corporation would compel Brown to make testimonial
communications that would be self-incriminating. ' 80 Therefore, the court concluded,
Fisher and Doe require that he not be held in contempt for refusing to produce the
records absent either a grant of use immunity by the government or a finding that
there is no likelihood of self-incrimination. '8'
A few months later a panel of the circuit strengthened Brown. 82 In In re Grand
Jury Empanneled,183 the court refused to accept the Government's contention that
Brown turned on the wording of the particular subpoena at issue there. The Govern-
ment relied on Judge Becker's concurrence in Brown, which had suggested that the
subpoena was invalid because it involved testimonial incrimination beyond that in-
herent in the act of production. 184 Rejecting the Government's argument, the court held
that Brown stood for the "broader proposition that a custodian of corporate records
who is subpoenaed to produce them cannot be held in contempt for failure to do so
if he demonstrates that such production would in fact tend to incriminate him."'' 85
The circuit's decisions are based on the view that, after Fisher and Doe, the
significant factor in determining the availability of the privilege is neither the nature
of the entity nor the contents of the documents, but rather "the communicative or
noncommunicative nature of the arguably incriminating disclosures sought to be
compelled."' 86 Indeed, the Brown court dismissed the contention that the Doe
holding applies only to the records of a sole-proprietorship, 87 and distinguished
Bellis on the grounds that it concerned the contents of the collective entity's
documents, and not the "often incriminatory nature of the act of production." 88 The
court stated that "the holdings in Fisher and Doe render untenable any suggestion
that Bellis would require a custodian to produce documents where the act of
production is both communicative and incriminatory." 89
177. In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 773 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d
Cir. 1985). A third case expressing this view was decided by a panel of the Third Circuit on May 20, 1987. In re Special
Federal Grand Jury Empanelled October 31, 1985, No. 87-5209, slip op. (3d Cir. May 20, 1987).
178. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985).
179. Id. at 529. In a very recent case, the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary result. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe),
No. 86-4922, slip op. (5th Cir. March 31, 1987) (l-Exis, Genfed library, App file).
180. Id. at 528.
181. Id.
182. In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 773 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1985).
183. 773 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1985).
184. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., dissenting).
185. In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 773 F.2d 45, 47 (3d Cir. 1985).
186. In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1985).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 528 n.2.
189. Id.
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The Third Circuit attempts to align its decisions with the standard collective
entity cases by asserting that the records of corporations must still be maintained and
can be compelled by a subpoena addressed to the corporation.190 Indeed, the Second
Circuit accepted this distinction as justification for the Third Circuit's decision in
Brown.'9' This distinction ignores, however, the long line of Supreme Court cases
holding that the representative of a corporation may not assert a personal fifth
amendment privilege when the records of the entity are sought, regardless of whether
the documents will incriminate the representative personally, and regardless of
whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation or to the particular representa-
tive. 192
Nevertheless, it might be argued that there is justification for the Third Circuit
allowing the sole shareholder of a professional corporation to assert his or her
personal fifth amendment privilege when the records of such entity are sought. A
professional corporation is not substantially different from a sole-proprietorship in the
degree of personal interest in the business which the shareholder/owner possesses.
Indeed, it might be argued that it is putting form over substance to allow the
sole-proprietor in Doe to assert the privilege while denying it to the sole shareholder
in Brown. These arguments are not, however, the basis of the Third Circuit's holding
in Brown. 193 The court did not attempt to craft an exception to the collective entity
rule for the documents of a professional corporation based upon the professional
corporation's similarity to a sole-proprietorship. ' 94Rather, that court relied upon an
interpretation of Fisher and Doe which departed from the well- settled principles of
the collective entity doctrine. 195
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of the applicability of the
fifth amendment privilege to the records of a professional corporation. Nonetheless,
the rationale of Bellis and other collective entity cases suggests that the professional
corporation should not be treated differently than any other artificial entity. 196 More-
over, even the suggestion in Bellis that the members of a small family partnership
190. Id.
191. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Thirteen Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1459 (1986).
192. See e.g., Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 44-45)
and Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
193. In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1985) (Garth, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the Third Circuit's view
in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), No. 86-4922, slip op. (5th Cir. March 31, 1987) (Laxis, Genfed library, App file),
a case, like Brown, involving a one-person corporation. The court stated:
In Bellis, the [Supreme] Court defined a collective entity as "an organization which is recognized as an
independent entity apart from its individual members." The Court reaffirmed this definition of collective entity
in Doe. The law of Mississippi is clear that a corporation is a creature of law, with a legal identity separate and
distinct from that of its owners. And the Supreme Court noted in Bellis that corporations, no matter how small,
are collective entities. Accordingly, Braswell's contention that his one "man" corporations are not collective
entities must fail.
Thus, "no privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records regardless of how small the
corporation may be." Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100.
Id. (citations omitted).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
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might be able to assert the privilege' 97 does not imply that it should also be available
to the sole shareholder of a professional corporation. The corporation is a creature of
the state, a fact that does not vary depending upon the corporation's size. In choosing
to do business in the corporate form, the shareholder of the professional corporation
has been granted by the state certain rights and privileges not available to the
sole-proprietor, 98 and as such has no complaint when the state compels the
production of the corporation's documents over the shareholder's fifth amendment
claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decisions are rather remarkable in light of the consistent
support which the collective entity doctrine has received in the Supreme Court.199
Specifically, that circuit deemphasizes the wisdom of allowing the visitatorial powers
of the state to predominate in document production cases involving corporations over
any individual claim to the fifth amendment privilege. This wisdom was articulated
by the Court as long ago as 1906 in Hale v. Henkel,2° and has never been overruled
or supplanted by the Court. Furthermore, the Third Circuit ignores the holding of the
Court in Bellis that the applicability of the collective entity doctrine should not
depend upon the size of the organization or upon the form which the entity takes, but
rather upon the organizational character of the records and the representative capacity
of the claimant. 201 Indeed, Bellis is cited with approval in both Fisher and Doe.2 02
Finally, since both Fisher and Doe involved the records of an individual sole-
proprietor,2 03 the Third Circuit's reliance on those cases as precedent in the collective
entity context is dubious.
The Second Circuit, and most recently the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, 204
while generally adhering to the doctrine and thus refusing to allow the representatives
of collective entities to assert the privilege to avoid document production, have
departed from that position in limited circumstances. These departures are based on
the view that, while the collective entity can never refuse to produce documents, the
custodian can refuse if the normally testimonial-free act of production happens to be
incriminatory. In such cases the corporation must appoint someone to produce the
records who will not be incriminated by the act of production.
The majority view, represented in the decisions of the Sixth Circuit, follows
most closely the precise commands of the collective entity doctrine. Under this view
there are two lines of authority in document production cases: the Fisher/Doe line and
197. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 62-104.
200. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
201. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1974); see supra text accompanying note 71.
202. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,411-13 & n. 14 (1976); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,608 (1984).
203. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 & n.3 (1976); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606 (1984).
204. See supra notes 160 & 175.
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the collective entity line. The two lines do not cross. Fisher and Doe control when
the records sought are the personal records of the person subpoenaed. In the collective
entity context, however, Bellis and White provide the analysis. Thus, the represen-
tative of a collective entity cannot look to Fisher and Doe for authority to invoke the
fifth amendment privilege when the documents of the entity are sought.
Timothy F. Sweeney
